Flock ALPRs in Camarillo: What We Know and What Still Needs Answers

At a recent Camarillo City Council meeting, the Ventura County Sheriff’s Office gave a detailed presentation on the use of Flock automated license plate readers (ALPRs) in Camarillo. Councilmembers asked questions about how the technology works, who can access the information, the 2025 data-access incident, audits, costs, and the system’s role in solving crimes.

Residents also raised thoughtful concerns about privacy, camera placement, data sharing, vendor accountability, and the long-term implications of this technology.

I believe both sides of that discussion deserve to be heard.

ALPRs have helped law enforcement solve crimes and recover stolen property. At the same time, government has a responsibility to understand the technology it uses, establish appropriate safeguards, and be able to answer reasonable questions from the public.

Here is what I learned from the presentation, what councilmembers asked, and what residents raised.

What the Sheriff’s Office Presented

How Flock ALPRs Work

According to Commander Tennessen, fixed Flock cameras are triggered by motion and capture images of license plates. The system converts those images into a plate read along with the date, time, and location. The information is stored in an encrypted system hosted through Amazon Web Services.

The cameras can capture information including a vehicle’s license plate, make, color, type, and certain characteristics such as roof racks or bumper stickers.

Commander Tennessen emphasized that the system does not use facial recognition, identify the driver, automatically conduct DMV searches on ordinary vehicle reads, or reveal why someone is traveling.

Legal Context

The presentation discussed recent case law, including U.S. v. Porter and Schmidt v. Norfolk, concerning the use of ALPR technology and the Fourth Amendment. The Sheriff’s Office presented the legal landscape as generally supporting the use of ALPRs on public roads without treating an individual plate read as a Fourth Amendment search requiring a warrant.

Hot Lists and Law-Enforcement Alerts

ALPR reads can be compared against law-enforcement hot lists, including stolen vehicles, plates associated with crimes, and agency-created hot lists.

When the system identifies a potential match, it generates an alert.

Sheriff’s Office policy requires deputies to visually verify the license plate and confirm that the alert is still active through dispatch before taking enforcement action.

Data Retention

Non-evidentiary ALPR images are retained for one year on a rolling basis. Each read is deleted one year after it was captured.

If an ALPR image becomes evidence in a criminal case, it can be tagged and retained according to the requirements of that case.

Who Can Access the System

Commander Tennessen said access is limited to specifically trained users using individual logins and multi-factor authentication.

Users conducting searches must provide information including the offense type, case number, and reason for the search.

The Ventura County Sheriff’s Office has agreements with 58 California law-enforcement agencies that allow those agencies to conduct searches. Agencies without an agreement must request a search, which is reviewed and approved by a person.

The Sheriff’s Office stated that it does not share its ALPR data with ICE, Border Patrol, DHS, or agencies outside California.

Audits and Oversight

Following a 2025 data-access incident, the Sheriff’s Office began conducting daily audits. After several months, those audits moved to a weekly schedule.

The Crime Analysis Unit conducts the audits and also performs annual reviews of users.

Commander Tennessen said the audits examine searches to determine whether they were appropriate and whether an out-of-state agency accessed the system.

The audit results are not currently posted on the Sheriff’s transparency dashboard, although information may be obtainable through a public records request.

The 2025 Data-Access Incident

From approximately mid-February to mid-March 2025, Ventura County ALPR information became searchable by agencies outside California.

Commander Tennessen stated that no one at the Ventura County Sheriff’s Office changed the setting that allowed the access.

During the council discussion, two remaining possibilities were discussed: an action by a Flock employee or a software problem.

Flock has since changed its code to prevent agencies outside California from searching California law-enforcement ALPR data.

Camera Placement

The Sheriff’s Office described its placement strategy as data-driven. Cameras are concentrated in locations associated with crime patterns, including theft corridors, neighborhoods experiencing repeated burglaries, and routes commonly used to enter and leave Camarillo.

Cost and Number of Cameras

Camarillo pays approximately $87,250 per year for 25 Flock cameras: 20 fixed cameras and five mobile units.

An Organized Retail Theft task force funded through a California state grant provided another 12 Flock cameras at no cost to the City.

Crime Investigations and Recoveries

Commander Tennessen provided examples in which ALPR information contributed to investigations involving stolen vehicles, a gun-store burglary, homicide and shooting investigations, mail theft, retail theft, firearm arrests, stolen trailers, and the recovery of approximately $1.5 million in stolen property.

He also reported 38 stolen vehicles recovered in 2024, 46 in 2025, and 30 so far in 2026.

These results are an important part of the discussion when evaluating both the benefits and concerns surrounding ALPR technology.

Other Vendors

The Sheriff’s Office has previously used other ALPR vendors, including Vigilant/Motorola, and is testing alternatives such as Axon.

Commander Tennessen said the department continues to monitor the market and has not made a decision about changing vendors. The current Flock contract runs through September of next year.

Accountability

Commander Tennessen distinguished between misuse by Sheriff’s Office personnel and failures involving the technology or vendor.

Potential misuse by deputies can result in an internal investigation and discipline. Systemic failures involving the vendor would instead be addressed through contractual remedies, potentially including changing vendors.

Questions Councilmembers Asked

Councilmembers raised a number of questions following the presentation.

How long is the data retained?

Council Member Kildee asked whether the one-year retention period operates on a rolling basis or by calendar year.

Commander Tennessen said it operates on a per-read basis. Each read is deleted one year after capture unless it becomes evidence in a case, in which case it is tagged and retained as evidence for the duration required by the case or adjudication.

Is the data shared with federal agencies?

Council Member Kildee asked whether the data is shared with federal agencies.

Commander Tennessen said it is not shared with ICE, Border Patrol, DHS, or agencies outside California.

How is the Organized Retail Theft task force funded?

Council Member Kildee asked about the Organized Retail Theft task force and its funding.

Commander Tennessen said the task force was funded through a California state grant obtained approximately three years ago. The grant funded positions that end this year and also provided license plate readers. Funding for the ORT cameras is expected to continue for approximately another year.

Can Flock users search for anyone they want?

Council Member Santangelo asked whether the system allows users to search anyone they choose.

Commander Tennessen said the system does not search for people. Searches can be conducted using a full or partial license plate, vehicle make, color, type, and certain vehicle characteristics such as roof racks or bumper stickers.

Are users specifically trained?

Council Member Santangelo asked whether officers authorized to use the ALPR database receive specific training.

Commander Tennessen said yes. Only specifically trained users may access the system.

How long has the Sheriff’s Office used ALPR technology?

Council Member Santangelo asked how long the agency has used ALPRs.

Commander Tennessen said the agency has used mobile ALPR technology since 2013 and had more rudimentary systems before that.

Who conducts the audits?

Council Member Santangelo asked who is responsible for auditing the system.

Commander Tennessen said the Crime Analysis Unit in Special Services conducts the audits.

Are audits currently conducted weekly?

Council Member Santangelo asked whether audits are now performed weekly.

Commander Tennessen said yes. Following the 2025 incident, audits were initially performed daily and later moved to a weekly schedule.

Is the Sheriff’s Office considering other vendors?

Council Member Santangelo asked how seriously the Sheriff’s Office is examining alternatives to Flock.

Commander Tennessen said the agency is monitoring the market and testing alternatives, including Axon. The department previously used Vigilant/Motorola, and no decision about changing vendors has been made.

What happened with ALPR programs in Oxnard and Los Angeles?

Council Member Bravo asked about reports concerning Oxnard and LAPD changing or pausing their use of Flock.

Commander Tennessen said Oxnard reached the end of its contract rather than cancelling in the middle of it and is exploring other vendors. Oxnard has also added ALPR technology to patrol vehicles.

He said LAPD paused Flock at the end of its contract while negotiating contract language but continues to use other ALPR systems.

What about concerns involving heat maps in Oshkosh?

Council Member Bravo asked about an article concerning ALPR heat maps in Oshkosh.

Commander Tennessen said he had read the same article but did not know the specifics of the police chief’s concerns about heat maps. He said he would investigate and report back.

What caused the 2025 data-access incident?

Council Member Bravo asked for an update on the three possible explanations previously discussed: someone at VCSO changed the setting, a Flock employee changed it, or a software problem occurred.

Commander Tennessen stated that no one at the Ventura County Sheriff’s Office changed the setting. That left an action by Flock or a system issue as the remaining possibilities discussed.

Who is accountable if the technology is misused or fails?

Council Member Bravo asked who would be accountable for misuse or a security failure and whether the 2025 incident constituted a violation of state law.

Commander Tennessen said misuse by Sheriff’s Office personnel could result in internal investigation and discipline. He said the Sheriff’s Office did not violate state law because it did not intentionally share the information. A vendor-related system failure would instead be addressed through contractual remedies.

How many cameras are operating in Camarillo?

During questioning by Council Member Bravo and a follow-up from Mayor Tennessen, Commander Tennessen said Camarillo pays approximately $87,250 per year for 25 Flock cameras: 20 fixed and five mobile.

The Organized Retail Theft task force provided an additional 12 Flock cameras at no cost to the City.

Do California law-enforcement partners have unrestricted access?

Mayor Tennessen asked whether agencies with agreements have unfettered access to ALPR information.

Commander Tennessen said California law-enforcement partners with an MOU can search the database directly but must provide information including a case number, offense type, and reason for the search.

Agencies without an MOU must request a search, and those requests are verified and approved by a person.

Can out-of-state agencies still search California ALPR data?

Mayor Tennessen asked whether the nationwide-access issue identified in 2025 had been eliminated.

Commander Tennessen said Flock updated its code to prevent agencies outside California from searching California law-enforcement ALPR data and that Ventura County's information has not been accessible to out-of-state agencies since mid-March 2025.

How has ALPR technology contributed to investigations?

During the discussion, Commander Tennessen provided several examples of cases in which ALPR information contributed to arrests, investigations, or property recovery.

Those included a gun-store burglary, locating a homicide suspect, recovering stolen trailers and approximately $1.5 million in stolen property, stolen vehicle recoveries, mail-theft arrests, the arrest of a gang member with a loaded firearm, and retail-theft arrests.

What exactly do the audits review, and are the results public?

Council Member Bravo asked what the audits examine and whether the findings are available to the public.

Commander Tennessen said audits review searches to determine whether they were appropriate and whether out-of-state agencies accessed the information.

The results are not currently published on the Sheriff’s transparency dashboard but may be requested through the public records process.

Who requested the audit that discovered the 2025 incident?

Commander Tennessen said he requested the audit that uncovered the 2025 data-access issue.

What Residents Raised

Residents brought another perspective to the discussion, and several concerns were raised repeatedly during public comment.

Cameras Near Schools and Churches

Residents identified cameras near Las Positas Elementary School, Adolfo Camarillo High School, and St. Mary Magdalene Church.

Some questioned whether the location or angle of these cameras could create the appearance of monitoring children, families, or people attending religious services.

Residents asked that the specific cameras be inspected and that their placement and angles be reconsidered where appropriate.

Vendor Trust and Accountability

Several residents focused on the 2025 incident and the fact that its precise cause had not been definitively identified.

Speakers questioned whether responsibility rested with Flock, an individual employee, or a software failure and expressed concern about how and when the incident was disclosed.

Some residents said the incident damaged their trust in Flock as a vendor and questioned whether the company had been sufficiently transparent about what occurred.

Third-Party Access, Sharing, and Retention

Residents raised concerns about information potentially being accessed or shared outside the agencies directly operating the system, including concerns about federal immigration enforcement.

They asked for clearer limits governing who can query the database, how information can subsequently be shared, and how long information is retained.

Privacy, Mass Surveillance, and Civil Liberties

Some speakers argued that ALPR networks should be considered not simply as individual cameras photographing vehicles on public roads, but as part of a larger system capable of documenting vehicle movements over time.

Residents raised concerns about the potential use of such information to reveal visits to political events, religious institutions, medical facilities, or other sensitive locations.

Speakers also cited legal cases addressing privacy and the collection of aggregate location information.

Emerging Technology and Future Capabilities

Residents raised questions about capabilities that could develop beyond what the cameras do today.

Those concerns included artificial intelligence, increasingly sophisticated identification through vehicle characteristics, and the possibility that future sensors or technologies could be combined to create more detailed identity and location information.

Transparency and Local Oversight

Residents called for greater public access to contracts, audits, policies, and information about system changes.

Some asked for contracts to be made fully available without redactions where legally possible and for clearer rules concerning ownership and control of the data.

Residents also requested independent audits, regular public reporting, stronger contractual protections, and local oversight of significant changes to the technology.

Alternatives and Community Involvement

Some residents asked the City and Sheriff’s Office to explore alternative ALPR vendors and develop contingency options rather than relying on a single company.

Suggestions also included creating a citizens’ committee or holding public town halls to provide continuing oversight, education, and community input.

Specific Cameras Identified by Residents

Residents specifically requested that officials inspect cameras they identified near St. Mary Magdalene Church, Las Positas Elementary School, and Adolfo Camarillo High School and report back regarding their locations, purposes, and camera angles.

Questions I’m Still Exploring

Coming soon.

I am continuing to review the information presented to the City Council, the questions raised by residents, and additional research regarding Flock ALPR technology. I will update this page with the questions I believe still need answers and my conclusions after completing that review.

Methodology Note

This analysis was developed from the City Council meeting, presentation materials, council discussion, and public comments. Otter.ai was used to assist with transcription, and ChatGPT was used to help organize the material, summarize key themes, and prepare the information for this page. I reviewed the material before publication.